IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
     
    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
     
     
     
    Anka Apostolouski, :
     
    Plaintiff-Appellant, :
    No. 04AP-1105
    v. :
    (C.P.C. No. 02CVC04-3600)
     
     
    Stephen Sharp, and Jason Cohen, : (
    ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
     
    Defendants-Appellees. :
     
     
     
     
    O P I N I O N
     
    Rendered on May 24, 2005
     
     
     
    Hillis & Small, LLC
    , and
    Scott T. Hillis
    , for appellant.
     
    Frost & Maddox Co., L.P.A.,
    and
    Mark S. Maddox
    , for
    appellee Jason Cohen.
     
     
    APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Ple
    as.
     
     
    FRENCH, J.
    {¶1}
     
    Plaintiff-appellant, Anka Apostolouski, appeals fro
    m the judgment of the
    Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting summ
    ary judgment in favor of
    defendant-appellee, Jason Cohen.
    {¶2}
     
    Appellant and appellee were involved in a three-car
    accident on
    February 13, 1998. On that date, law enforcement p
    repared an accident report and
    listed appellee's address as 6213 Roxburgh Court in
    Columbus, Ohio, the address
    where appellee's mother, Linda Cohen, resides. The
    accident report also denotes that
    No. 04AP-1105
     
     
    2
     
    appellee's father, Robert Cohen, owned the car appe
    llee was driving and lived on Laurel
    Ridge in Gahanna, Ohio. The report lists appellee'
    s phone number as Robert Cohen's.
    {¶3}
     
    Appellant filed a negligence action against appelle
    e on February 4, 2000.
    Appellant also filed against: (1) Robert Cohen; and
    (2) Stephen and Douglas Sharp,
    individuals pertaining to the other automobile invo
    lved in the accident.
    {¶4}
     
    While appellee's answer to that complaint is not pa
    rt of our record,
    according to appellee, he denied in that answer bei
    ng a resident of Ohio, and he
    asserted the defense of insufficient service of pro
    cess. Also, on October 23, 2000,
    appellee answered appellant's Civ.R. 33 interrogato
    ries. In those answers, appellee
    indicated that he resided at 5211 Wilkins Avenue, A
    partment 4, Pittsburgh,
    Pennsylvania.
    {¶5}
     
    Ultimately, appellant voluntarily dismissed the act
    ion on April 3, 2001.
    However, appellant re-filed the negligence complain
    t against appellee and Stephen
    Sharp on April 2, 2002.
    {¶6}
     
    In the re-filed complaint, appellant listed appelle
    e's address at Roxburgh
    Court in Columbus, Ohio. Thus, the Franklin County
    Clerk of Courts sent certified mail
    service on appellee to the Roxburgh Court address.
    Linda Cohen signed the certified
    mail return receipt on April 19, 2002.
    {¶7}
     
    On March 24, 2003, appellant requested certified ma
    il service on appellee
    to Robert Cohen's address at Laurel Ridge in Gahann
    a, Ohio. On March 25, 2003,
    appellant requested certified mail service on appel
    lee at the address listed in the
    interrogatories: 5211 Wilkins Avenue, Pittsburgh, P
    ennsylvania. The clerk of courts
    No. 04AP-1105
     
     
    3
     
    received the certified mail return receipts as uncl
    aimed. Thus, these service attempts
    were unsuccessful.
    {¶8}
     
    Also, on March 24, 2003, appellant moved for defaul
    t judgment against
    appellee because appellee had not filed an answer t
    o the re-filed complaint. Appellant
    sent a copy of the motion to appellee at the Roxbur
    gh Court address. Appellee did not
    respond, and the trial court granted the default ju
    dgment on March 28, 2003.
    {¶9}
     
    On May 22, 2003, appellant deposed Linda Cohen. Ac
    cording to Linda
    Cohen, appellee moved out of the Roxburgh Court add
    ress in 1996 and moved in with
    her ex-husband, Robert Cohen. However, Linda Cohen
    continued to serve as the
    "residential and custodial parent address for educa
    tional purposes." (Depo. at 10.)
    Linda Cohen testified that appellee then moved out
    of Ohio in 1998 to attend college in
    Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. According to Linda Cohen
    , appellee lived in a dormitory
    during his first year at college. During his secon
    d year at college, appellee moved to an
    address on Wilkins and Fifth. At the beginning of
    his third year in college, appellee
    moved to 5700 Wilkins Avenue in Pittsburgh, Pennsyl
    vania. Linda Cohen testified that
    appellee continued to reside at 5700 Wilkins Avenue
    upon graduating from college in
    May 2003. Furthermore, Linda Cohen stated that app
    ellee did not come to Ohio during
    the summers and even spent one summer working in Se
    attle, Washington. Linda
    Cohen also noted that, since April 2002, she saw ap
    pellee approximately "half a dozen
    times," with half of that time constituting appelle
    e coming to Columbus to visit her.
    (Depo. at 19.)
    {¶10}
     
    Linda Cohen would "take care of" appellee's mail th
    at arrived at her
    house. (Depo. at 18.) She "believe[s]" that she r
    eceived the original February 2000
    No. 04AP-1105
     
     
    4
     
    negligence complaint at her address on Roxburgh Cou
    rt. (Depo. at 14.) Appellee had
    asked Linda Cohen to send documents pertaining to t
    he suit to Robert Cohen, an
    attorney. Appellee told Linda Cohen that Robert Co
    hen was handling the suit.
    {¶11}
     
    Linda Cohen also verified that she signed for the c
    ertified mail containing
    the April 2002 complaint and forwarded it to Robert
    Cohen in accordance with
    appellee's previous instructions. She then informe
    d appellee that she received the
    newly filed negligence complaint and that she forwa
    rded it to Robert Cohen. However,
    Linda Cohen believed that it was "[q]uestionable" t
    hat Robert Cohen actually forwarded
    the complaint to appellee. (Depo. at 25.)
    {¶12}
     
    Lastly, Linda Cohen testified that she contacted Ro
    bert Cohen after
    receiving the deposition notice and that Robert Coh
    en told her that he was not handling
    the suit. At that point, Robert Cohen gave her the
    name of appellee's counsel.
    {¶13}
     
    On June 3, 2003, appellee filed a motion to vacate
    the March 28, 2003
    default judgment, claiming that he "never received
    a copy of the Complaint or
    Summons." Appellant filed no response, and the tri
    al court vacated the default
    judgment on September 2, 2003.
    {¶14}
     
    In the meantime, on June 3, 2003, appellant request
    ed ordinary mail
    service on appellee to Robert Cohen's address at La
    urel Ridge in Gahanna, Ohio. The
    mail came back to the clerk of courts as unclaimed.
    Thus, the service was
    unsuccessful.
    {¶15}
     
    On September 23, 2003, appellee filed a motion to d
    ismiss, arguing that
    appellant failed to properly serve him with the com
    plaint and that the statute of
    limitations barred the negligence action. Appellan
    t filed her memorandum against the
    No. 04AP-1105
     
     
    5
     
    motion to dismiss on November 3, 2003. On December
    4, 2003, the trial court denied
    appellee's motion, finding that "[o]n the meager ev
    idence presented, this Court can
    hardly conclude that the summons was not sent to th
    e address at which Mr. Cohen was
    most likely to receive notice." Indicating that ap
    pellee's motion relied "entirely upon
    evidence outside of the complaint[,]" the court sta
    ted that, if appellee "wishes his * * *
    motion to be converted to a summary judgment motion
    , he shall indicate that preference
    by filing a summary judgment motion[.]"
    {¶16}
     
    Thereafter, on December 16, 2003, appellant request
    ed certified mail
    service on appellee to 2700 Wilkins Avenue in Pitts
    burgh, Pennsylvania. The clerk of
    courts received the certified mail return receipt a
    s unclaimed, with a notation, "no such
    number/street."
    {¶17}
     
    After the trial court denied appellee's motion to d
    ismiss, appellee filed an
    answer to appellant's re-filed negligence complaint
    on December 24, 2003. In the
    answer, appellee claimed that appellant did not obt
    ain proper service of process.
    {¶18}
     
    On March 22, 2004, appellant requested certified ma
    il service on appellee
    to 5700 Wilkins Avenue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
    The clerk of courts received the
    certified mail return receipt as unclaimed.
    {¶19}
     
    On April 12, 2004, appellant requested certified ma
    il service on appellee
    to 5636 Wilkins Avenue, Apartment 1, Pittsburgh, Pe
    nnsylvania. This time, on April 23,
    2004, appellee signed the certified mail return rec
    eipt.
    {¶20}
     
    Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment on May
    24, 2004. Appellee
    reiterated his arguments that appellant failed to o
    btain proper service of process and
    that the statute of limitations barred this action.
    Appellant did not respond to the motion,
    No. 04AP-1105
     
     
    6
     
    and the trial court granted summary judgment in fav
    or of appellee on September 1,
    2004.
    {¶21}
     
    Appellant appeals, raising two assignments of error
    :
    1. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
    ERROR BY GRANTING DEFENDANT-APPELLEE'S
    MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS SERVICE OF
    PROCESS UPON DEFENDANT-APPELLEE JASON
    COHEN WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT.
     
    2. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
    ERROR BY GRANTING DEFENDANT-APPELLEE'S
    MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS THE STATUTE
    OF LIMITATIONS ON THE CLAIMS AGAINST
    DEFENDANT-APPELLEE JASON COHEN HAD NOT, AND
    STILL HAVE NOT EXPIRED.
     
    {¶22}
     
    In her assignments of error, appellant contends tha
    t the trial court erred by
    granting summary judgment in favor of appellee. We
    disagree.
    {¶23}
     
    We apply de novo review to a trial court's decision
    to grant summary
    judgment.
    Sadinsky v. EBCO Mfg. Co.
    (1999), 134 Ohio App.3d 54, 58. Pursuant to
    Civ.R. 56(C), a trial court may grant summary judgm
    ent if: (1) there is no genuine issue
    of material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled
    to judgment as a matter of law; and (3)
    reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and
    , after "viewing such evidence
    most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party," tha
    t conclusion is adverse to the non-
    moving party.
    State ex rel. Mayes v. Holman
    (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 147, 148.
    {¶24}
     
    Appellant's failure to respond to the summary judgm
    ent motion does not
    compel automatic summary judgment. See
    Bank One, Columbus, N.A. v. Girardi's
    Restaurant & Bar, Inc.
    (Mar. 3, 1994), Franklin App. No. 93AP-1024. " '[
    E]ven if the
    non-moving party does not submit evidence opposing
    that which the moving party has
    submitted, Civ.R. 56(E) states that the court shall
    grant summary judgment only "if
    No. 04AP-1105
     
     
    7
     
    appropriate." ' "
    Bank One, Columbus, N.A.
    , citing
    Stemen v. Shibley
    (1982), 11 Ohio
    App.3d 263, 268.
    {¶25}
     
    In support of his summary judgment motion, appellee
    contended that
    appellant failed to commence this action under Civ.
    R. 3(A), which states that a civil
    action "is commenced by filing a complaint with the
    court, if service is obtained within
    one year from such filing upon a named defendant."
    According to appellee, appellant
    did not obtain proper service within one year of th
    e re-filed negligence action.
    {¶26}
     
    Civ.R. 3(A) provides a means for a court to clear i
    ts docket "if service has
    not been attained within the reasonable time of one
    year."
    Maryhew v. Yova
    (1984), 11
    Ohio St.3d 154, 157. Thus, a trial court may dismi
    ss an action if a plaintiff failed to
    obtain service within one year after filing the com
    plaint. Id.;
    Sheets v. Sasfy
    (Jan. 26,
    1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-539. "In general, th
    e one-year time requirement in
    Civ.R. 3(A) cannot be enlarged."
    Temple v. John Galt Co.
    (Apr. 10, 1997), Franklin
    App. No. 96APE10-1364. Cf.
    Goolsby v. Anderson Concrete Corp.
    (1991), 61 Ohio
    St.3d 549, 551 (allowing a very limited exception w
    here "service has not been obtained
    within one year of filing a complaint, and the subs
    equent refiling of an identical
    complaint within rule would provide an additional y
    ear within which to obtain service and
    commence an action under Civ.R. 3[A]").
    {¶27}
     
    Here, appellant claims that she properly obtained s
    ervice upon appellee in
    April 2002, when the clerk of courts sent the compl
    aint to Linda Cohen's address. We
    disagree.
    {¶28}
     
    Service of process must comply with due process req
    uirements.
    Regional
    Airport Authority v. Swinehart
    (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 403, 406. " 'An elementary
    and
    No. 04AP-1105
     
     
    8
     
    fundamental requirement of due process * * * is not
    ice
    reasonably calculated
    , under all
    the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
    the pendency of the action and afford
    them an opportunity to present their objections.' "
    (Emphasis sic.) Id., quoting
    Mullane
    v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
    (1950), 339 U.S. 306, 314. Thus, due process
    requires a plaintiff to obtain service of process i
    n a manner " 'reasonably calculated' to
    reach interested parties."
    Swinehart
    at 406. We "examine each case upon its particular
      
    facts to determine if notice was reasonably calcula
    ted to reach the interested party." Id.
    at 407.
    {¶29}
     
    In
    Thoenes v. Tatro
    (Or.1974), 529 P.2d 912, 919-920, the Oregon
    Supreme Court held that a plaintiff did not obtain
    proper service of process on an out-of-
    state college student by serving the complaint at t
    he student's parents' address. Like
    Swinehart
    , the court indicated that due process requires tha
    t service of process be
    "reasonably calculated to come to one's attention."
        
    Thoenes
    at 919. The court noted
    that due process precluded the plaintiff from relyi
    ng "upon a member of defendant's
    family to transmit the information" out of state.
    Id. at 920. Similarly, the court indicated
    that "it is possible that notice may not reach the
    defendant when papers are so
    delivered" to him. Id.
    {¶30}
     
    Likewise, in
    Cox v. Quigley
    (D.Maine 1992), 141 F.R.D. 222, 223, the
    United States District Court for the District of Ma
    ine concluded that a plaintiff did not
    properly serve a defendant at his parents' address.
    The court stated that the defendant
    had resided and found employment out of state after
    he graduated from college. Id. at
    226. The court found it irrelevant that the defend
    ant sometimes used his parents'
    address to obtain financial documents. Id. Rather
    , the court acknowledged that the
    No. 04AP-1105
     
     
    9
     
    defendant was transient and that the plaintiff need
    ed "to find a method that will
    reasonably assure timely notice of the lawsuit." I
    d.
    {¶31}
     
    Moreover, in
    Mills v. Coil
    (Ind.App.1995), 647 N.E.2d 679, 681, an Indiana
    appellate court concluded that a plaintiff did not
    properly serve an out-of-state defendant
    at his mother's address. The court reasoned that t
    he defendant "was residing
    independently and had no intention of returning to
    Indiana." Id. Thus, like
    Swinehart
    ,
    the appellate court agreed with the trial court tha
    t service of process "was not
    reasonably calculated to inform [the defendant] of
    the suit." Id.
    {¶32}
     
    Here, when the clerk of courts sent service of proc
    ess to Linda Cohen's
    address in April 2002, appellee was attending colle
    ge in Pennsylvania. He had not lived
    at Linda Cohen's address since 1996, and he had not
    lived in Ohio since 1998. Since
    leaving Ohio, appellee has not maintained regular a
    ccess to Linda Cohen's home.
    Appellee did not reside with his parents during sum
    mer breaks and even worked in the
    state of Washington during one summer. Thus, at th
    e time of service, appellee was no
    longer living with his mother and was living out of
    state with no intention of moving back
    to Ohio. Therefore, appellant's service at Linda C
    ohen's address risked appellee not
    receiving the complaint.
    {¶33}
     
    We further conclude that service to Linda Cohen's
    address was improper
    because appellee actually informed appellant that h
    e was no longer living in Ohio. By
    his answer and answers to interrogatories in the fi
    rst action, appellee put appellant on
    notice that proper service would be in Pennsylvania
    , not Ohio. "[W]e look suspiciously
    at any service attempted by means falling short of
    that most likely to achieve success."
    Swinehart
    at 406. Accordingly, like
    Thoenes
    ,
    Cox
    , and
    Mills
    , and pursuant to
    No. 04AP-1105
     
     
    10
    Swinehart
    , we conclude that service of process to Linda Cohe
    n's address was not
    "reasonably calculated" to reach appellee.
    {¶34}
     
    Nor did Robert Cohen's receipt of the complaint con
    stitute service of
    process "reasonably calculated" to reach appellee.
    Robert Cohen was not representing
    appellee in the case and was no longer a party in t
    he action. Although appellee had
    initially asked Linda Cohen to send Robert Cohen do
    cuments pertaining to the suit, due
    process required appellant to serve appellee with t
    he complaint in a manner that would
    provide him notice of the action and not force him
    to rely on either of his parents to
    transmit information about the suit. See
    Thoenes
    at 920.
    {¶35}
     
    We recognize, as the trial court did initially when
    it denied appellee's
    motion to dismiss, the "common knowledge that, typi
    cally, students frequently move
    during their college careers. Mr. Cohen's mother's
    testimony as to his several
    addresses during his own college career merely serv
    ed to verify this." In addition, we
    acknowledge that the police report identified appel
    lee's address as the Roxburgh Court
    address, that is, his mother's address. It is diff
    icult "for plaintiffs to serve some highly
    mobile or transient defendants."
    Cox
    at 226. In particular, "[p]laintiffs have occasio
    nally
    found themselves in tight spots when the Civ.R. 3(A
    ) one year period has almost run
    and the defendant is out of state."
    Mullins v. Geddings
    (Mar. 20, 1986), Ross App. No.
    1170. Nonetheless, even though appellee moved to s
    everal out-of-state addresses,
    appellant was responsible for finding "a method tha
    t will reasonably assure timely notice
    of the lawsuit."
    Cox
    at 226.
    {¶36}
     
    We also note that, while appellee denies ever recei
    ving the complaint, it
    appears from the record that his father received th
    e complaint and that his lawyer was
    No. 04AP-1105
     
     
    11
    kept apprised of the case as it proceeded against t
    he co-defendant. From the record,
    we can only conclude that appellee was aware of the
    lawsuit and was avoiding service
    intentionally. As troubling as this legal gamesman
    ship is, however, the Ohio Supreme
    Court has declined to create an exception to Civ.R.
    3(A) based on an "indicia of legal
    gamesmanship on the part of the defendant and her c
    ounsel[.]"
    Maryhew
    at 159. And,
    a defendant's general awareness of the suit "does n
    ot dispense with the necessity of
    service." Id. at 157.
    {¶37}
     
    A plaintiff is not without recourse if unable to lo
    cate a defendant when
    attempting service. See
    Hrabak v. Collins
    (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 117, 122. Pursuant
    to R.C. 2703.20, in a civil suit "arising out of *
    * * any accident or collision occurring
    within this state," the Ohio secretary of state is
    an agent for service of process for an
    out-of-state resident who operated a vehicle in Ohi
    o, or for an Ohio resident "being the
    licensed operator or owner of any motor vehicle und
    er the laws of this state, who
    subsequently becomes a nonresident or conceals his
    whereabouts." R.C. 2703.20 is a
    "special statutory proceeding" that exists apart fr
    om the Rules of Civil Procedure.
    Anson v. Tyree
    (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 223, 226.
    {¶38}
     
    In the final analysis, appellant was responsible fo
    r obtaining proper service
    of process within the one-year time period outlined
    in Civ.R. 3(A). See
    Maryhew
    at 159;
    Cox
    at 226. Appellant did not obtain proper service o
    f process when the clerk of courts
    sent the complaint to Linda Cohen's address.
      
    Therefore, appellant failed to obtain
    service of process within the Civ.R. 3(A) one-year
    period from her re-filing the
    negligence complaint on April 2, 2002. As such, th
    e trial court properly granted
    summary judgment in favor of appellee. See
    Maryhew
    at 157;
    Sheets
    .
     
    No. 04AP-1105
     
     
    12
    {¶39}
     
    Because the trial court properly granted summary ju
    dgment for lack of
    service of process, the subject of appellant's firs
    t assignment of error, we render moot
    appellant's second assignment of error, which conce
    rns whether appellant commenced
    this action within the applicable statute of limita
    tions. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). Accordingly,
    we overrule appellant's first assignment of error,
    render moot appellant's second
    assignment of error, and affirm the judgment of the
    Franklin County Court of Common
    Pleas.
    Judgment affirmed.
      
    KLATT and McGRATH, JJ., concur.
     
    _____________________________

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