IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    Albertine Mangum,
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    :
    v.
    :
    No. 99AP-682
    SunStar Acceptance Corp., Inc. et al.,
    :
    (REGULAR C ALENDAR)
    Defendants-Appellees.
    :
    _________________________________________________
    NUNC PRO TUNC
    D E C I S I O N
    Rendered on April 11, 2000
    _________________________________________________
    Otto Beatty, Jr., for appellant.
    Zeiger & Carpenter, David A. Wallace
    and Craig A.
    Calcaterra, for appellee SunStar Acceptance Corp., Inc.
    _________________________________________________
    APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Ple as.
    BRYANT, J.
    Plaintiff-appellant, Albertine Mangum, appeals fro m a judgment of the
    Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the
    summary judgment motion of
    defendant-appellee, SunStar Acceptance Corporation,
    Inc. ("SunStar"). Because
    plaintiff's appeal does not present a final appeala ble order, we dismiss for lack of
    jurisdiction.
    No. 99AP-682
    2
    On June 2, 1998, plaintiff filed a complaint again st SunStar, LTD Financial
    Services ("LTD"), John Doe, Inc., and John Doe Coll ection Agency. Plaintiff's complaint
    sought damages for defendants' conduct resulting in invasion of privacy and intentional
    and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. Both SunStar and LTD were served with
    summons and complaint on June 8, 1998.
    After filing an answer, SunStar filed a summary ju dgment motion. Following
    full briefing, the trial court granted SunStar's su mmary judgment motion with respect to
    plaintiff's claims for negligent and intentional in fliction of emotional distress. The trial
    court, however, denied the motion as to plaintiff's
    claim for invasion of privacy. On
    June 14, 1999, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal f rom the trial court's decision, and on
    June 14, 1999, plaintiff dismissed without prejudic e her "remaining claim for invasion of
    privacy." On appeal, plaintiff assigns the followin g errors:
    I. THE TRIAL JUDGE APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD
    FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN HE GRANTED THE
    APPELLEE'S
    MOTION
    FOR
    SUMMARY
    JUDGMENT
    DESPITE
    APPELLANT'S
    MOTION
    CONTRA
    WHICH
    RELIED
    UPON
    APPELLANT'S
    AFFIDAVIT
    WHICH
    SPECIFICALLY POINTED OUT HOW SHE SUSTAINED
    SERIOUS EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AS A RESULT OF
    APPELLEE'S
    UNWARRANTED
    DEBT
    COLLECTION
    ACTIVITIES.
    II. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
    WHEN HE GRANTED THE APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR
    SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ALL CLAIMS WITH THE
    EXCEPTION OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR INVASION OF
    PRIVACY.
    III. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
    WHEN HE RELIED ON HOUSH V. PETH (1956), 165 OHIO
    No. 99AP-682
    3
    ST. 35, AS THE STANDARD FOR ALLOWING CREDITORS
    TO MAKE COLLECTION EFFORTS ON AN "AMOUNT NOT
    OWED", as HOUSH DEALT WITH COLLECTION EFFORTS
    TO PERSUADE PAYMENT OF A " DEBT OR AMOUNT
    OWED."
    IV. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
    WHEN
    HE
    RULED
    THAT
    THE
    RESTRICTIONS
    REGARDING
    EMOTIONAL
    DISTRESS
    DAMAGES
    IN
    NEGLIGENT AND/OR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION CLAIMS
    ARE APPLICABLE WHERE A DEBT HAS BEEN PAID AND
    A CREDITOR CONTINUES TO CONTACT A "DEBTOR",
    SINCE THIS TYPE OF CASE IS DISTINGUISHED FROM
    CASES
    INVOLVING
    A
    TORTFEASOR'S
    ACTIONS
    DIRECTED
    TOWARD
    A
    THIRD
    PARTY
    WHICH
    INDIRECTLY CAUSES EMOTIONAL HARM TO A PARTY
    NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED.
    V. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
    WHEN HE RULED THAT THE APPELLANT'S DAMAGES
    (I.E. DEGREE OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS) SHOULD NOT
    BE CONSIDERED BY A JURY SINCE THEY WERE
    INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT
    AND/OR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
    DISTRESS.
    VI. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
    WHEN HE GRANTED THE APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR
    SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR
    INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
    VII. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
    WHEN HE RULED THAT THERE WAS A LACK OF
    EVIDENCE.
    APPELLANT
    SUFFERED
    SEVERE
    EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
    VIII. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
    ERROR WHEN HE GRANTED THE APPELLEE'S MOTION
    FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF
    NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
    No. 99AP-682
    4
    IX. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
    WHEN HE RULED THAT A NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
    EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIM WITHOUT PHYSICAL
    INJURY CAN ONLY BE SUSTAINED WHERE THE
    APPELLANT IS COGNIZANT OF A REAL DANGER, SUCH
    AS WHERE THE APPELLANT WAS A BYSTANDER OR IS
    PUT IN FEAR OF PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES.
    X. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
    WHEN HE RULED THAT A NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
    EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIM CANNOT BE SUSTAINED
    WHERE APPELLANT SUFFERS EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
    AS A DIRECT RESULT OF APPELLEE'S ACTIONS
    DIRECTED
    TOWARD
    APPELLANT,
    RATHER
    THAN
    INDIRECTLY THROUGH A THIRD PARTY.
    XI. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
    WHEN HE RULED THAT THERE WAS A LACK OF
    EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT WAS PLACED IN FEAR OF
    A
    REAL
    OR
    IMPENDING
    PHYSICAL
    PERIL
    BY
    APPELLEE'S NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO KEEP ACCURATE
    ACCOUNT RECORDS.
    XII. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
    WHEN HE FAILED TO ADDRESS APPELLANT'S CLAIM
    FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
    Because this court's jurisdiction is premised on
    plaintiff's appealing a final
    appealable order, we first examine the record in th at regard.
    Pursuant to R.C. 2505.02 as relevant here, a fina l appealable order is an
    order that affects a substantial right in an action
    that in effect determines the action or
    prevents a judgment, an order that affects a substa ntial right made in a special
    proceeding or upon summary application in an action after judgment, or an order that
    vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new tr ial. For a trial court's order to be final,
    No. 99AP-682
    5
    it must meet the requirements of both R.C. 2505.02
    and Civ.R. 54(B). Chef Italiano Corp.
    v. Kent State University (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 88. Civ.R. 54(B) states
    that:
    When more than one claim for relief is presented in
    an action
    whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or t hird-party
    claim, and whether arising out of the same or separ ate
    transactions, or when multiple parties are involved , the court
    may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewe r than all
    of the claims or parties only upon an express deter mination
    that there is no just reason for delay. In the abse nce of a
    determination that there is no just reason for dela y, any order
    or other form of decision, however designated, whic h
    adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights
    and
    liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall no t terminate the
    action as to any of the claims or parties, and the
    order or
    other form of decision is subject to revision at an y time before
    the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims a nd the rights
    and liabilities of all the parties.
    Given those parameters, the matter before us fail s to present a final
    appealable order. Initially, the trial court render ed its decision on May 21, 1999. Although
    the decision requests that counsel for defendant su bmit, on or before June 5, 1999, an
    entry reflecting the decision of the court, the rec ord contains no judgment entry. Indeed,
    plaintiff's June 14, 1999 notice of appeal referenc es a decision, not a judgment, rendered
    by the trial court. For that reason alone, the reco rd fails to present a final appealable
    order.
    Moreover, plaintiff's complaint was filed against
    two defendants, SunStar
    and LTD. Although SunStar filed a motion for summar y judgment, LTD did not. Thus, the
    trial court's summary judgment motion determined on ly those claims filed against
    SunStar. The trial court granted summary judgment o n two of the three claims, but found
    No. 99AP-682
    6
    issues of fact regarding plaintiff's invasion of pr ivacy claim. In an effort to create a final
    appealable order, plaintiff dismissed her invasion
    of privacy claim. Even if plaintiff's
    dismissal be deemed proper, and further be construe d to dismiss her invasion of privacy
    claim against both SunStar and LTD, plaintiff's cla ims for negligent and intentional
    infliction of emotional distress against LTD remain . Had the record included a judgment
    entry in which the trial court found no just cause
    for delay under Civ.R. 54(B), plaintiff's
    contentions regarding a final appealable order woul d be more persuasive.
    Given the foregoing, the record fails to present
    a final appealable order for
    this court's consideration. Lacking jurisdiction to consider something less than a final
    appealable order, we are compelled to dismiss plain tiff's appeal.
    Appeal dismissed.
    LAZARUS and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
    ____________

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