IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    Amy E. Brown,
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    :
    v.
    :
    No. 99AP-736
    Jamie L. Brown,
    :
    (REGULAR CALENDAR)
    Defendant-Appellant.
    :
    D E C I S I O N
    Rendered on March 14, 2000
    Amy E. Brown, pro se.
    Harris, McClellan, Binau & Cox, and Tonda L. Moore, for
    appellant.
    APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Ple as,
    Division of Domestic Relations.
    BOWMAN, P.J.
    Appellant, Jamie L. Brown, appeals from a judgment
    of the Franklin
    County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic
    Relations, granting a civil
    protection order to appellee, Amy E. Brown, that es tablished inter alia, custody and
    visitation with their son, Brandon, and child suppo rt. Appellee has not filed a brief.
    Appellant sets forth the following assignments of e rror:

    No. 99AP-736
    8
    I. RESPONDENT-APPELLANT'S FOURTEENTH AMEND-
    MENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW WAS VIO-
    LATED BY THE ERROUNOUS [ sic] ISSUANCE OF THE
    CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER AGAINST RESPONDENT-
    APPELLANT.
    II. THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROROUNOUS [ sic] DENIAL
    OF
    APPELLANT'S
    PARENTAL
    RIGHT
    TO
    FULL
    COMPANIONSHIP AND VISITATION WITH HIS INFANT
    CHILD WAS A VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S CONSTITU-
    TIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, AS WELL AS A
    VIOLATION OF THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT REGARD-
    ING O.R.C. 3113.31.
    III. THE TRIAL COURT ERROUNOUSLY [ sic] CALCU-
    LATED THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD GRANTED IN THE
    C.P.O. AND ENTERED AN IMPROPER WORKSHEET
    INTO THE RECORD.
    On May 29, 1999, appellee filed a petition for a c
    ivil protection order
    against appellant pursuant to R.C. 3113.31. Appell ee alleged that appellant hit, choked
    and kicked her, attempted to force her and their so n off the road, and had previously
    been convicted of domestic violence. The petition
    alleged the most recent assault
    against her by appellant occurred on May 8, 1999.
    An ex parte hearing was held
    June 1, 1999, and appellee was granted custody of B randon with no visitation by
    appellant, appellant was ordered to vacate the mari tal residence and to have no contact
    with appellee or their son. A hearing, as required
    by R.C. 3113.31, was set for June 8,
    1999. Appellant appeared and was granted a continu ance to June 15, 1999, in order to
    obtain counsel. Appellant failed to appear at the
    June 15, 1999 hearing; the record
    indicates appellee and her attorney were present.
    Following the hearing on June 15, 1999, the trial
    court granted appellee a
    civil protection order which provided, among other
    things, that appellant vacate the
    residence, that custody was granted to appellee wit h appellant granted supervised

    No. 99AP-736
    8
    visitation, and appellant was ordered to pay $642.6 7 per month in child support, plus the
    processing charge. The order provides it is to rem ain in effect for one year.
    Appellant's first and second assignments of error
    are related and will be
    addressed together. Appellant argues the decision
    of the trial court to grant a civil
    protection order and to award appellant only superv ised visits with his son was against
    the weight of the evidence. Appellant also argues
    the court order relating to custody
    and visitation was permanent.
    Appellant has failed to provide this court with a
    transcript of the
    proceedings as required by App.R. 9(B), or a statem ent of the evidence or proceedings
    as provided for in App.R. 9(C). The duty to provid e a transcript for appellate review falls
    upon the appellant. This is so because an appellan t bears the burden of showing error
    by reference to matters in the record. When portio ns of the transcript necessary for
    resolution of assigned errors are omitted from the record, an appellate court has nothing
    to pass upon and has no choice but to presume the v alidity of the lower court's
    proceedings and affirm. Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 197. In
    the absence of all the relevant evidence, a reviewi ng court must indulge the
    presumption of regularity of the proceedings and th e validity of the judgment in the trial
    court. It is appellant's responsibility to include all the evidence in the appellate record so
    that the claimed error is demonstrated to the revie wing court. Bates & Springer, Inc. v.
    Stallworth (1978), 56 Ohio App.2d 223, and Columbus v. Hodge (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d
    68.
    The trial court, in granting the civil protection
    order, found the allegations
    in the petition to be true based on the evidence su bmitted to it and, in the absence of a

    No. 99AP-736
    8
    transcript, we cannot conclude that the trial court 's findings are against the weight of the
    evidence or an abuse of discretion. Appellant's ar gument that he has been permanently
    deprived of custody or unrestricted visits with his
    son is without merit as the civil
    protection order expires by its own terms on June 1 5, 2000. Therefore, appellant's first
    and second assignments of error are overruled.
    In his third assignment of error, appellant argues
    that the award of child
    support in the amount of $642.67, plus the processi ng fee, is against the weight of the
    evidence and further that the court erred in granti ng support as the child support
    worksheet was not signed or notarized.
    R.C. 3113.215(B)(1) provides in part:
    (B)(1) In an action in which a child support order
    is issued ***
    under *** 3113.31 of the Revised Code, *** the cour t or [child
    support enforcement] agency shall calculate the amo unt of
    the obligor's child support obligation in accordanc e with the
    basic child support schedule in division (B) of thi s section,
    the applicable worksheet in division (E) or (F) of
    this section
    ***.
    R.C. 3113.215(E) provides:
    (E) When a court or child support enforcement agenc y
    calculates the amount of child support that will be required to
    be paid pursuant to a child support order or an adm inistrative
    child support order in a proceeding in which one pa rent is
    the residential parent and legal custodian of all o f the
    children who are the subject of the child support o rder or the
    court issues a shared parenting order, the court or
    child
    support enforcement agency shall use a worksheet th at is
    identical in content and form to the following work sheet[.]
    The statute then provides the format for a child su pport computation worksheet.
    In Marker v. Grimm (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 139, paragraphs one and two
    of
    the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held:

    No. 99AP-736
    8
    1. A child support computation worksheet, required
    to be
    used by a trial court in calculating the amount of
    an obligor's
    child support obligation in accordance with R.C. 31 13.215,
    must actually be completed and made a part of the t rial
    court's record.
    2. The terms of R.C. 3113.215 are mandatory in nat ure and
    must be followed literally and technically in all m aterial
    respects.
    The court further stated, at 142:
    As a threshold matter, we note that the record befo re us
    does not contain a completed child support computat ion
    worksheet. In this regard, a review of R.C. 3113.21 5 leads
    us to the conclusion that the statute mandates that a court
    "use" a worksheet identical in content and form to
    the R.C.
    3113.215(E) or (F) model worksheet, and that the am ount of
    an obligor's child support obligation must be calcu lated "in
    accordance with," and "pursuant to," the basic chil d support
    schedule and appropriate worksheet. In our judgment , these
    mandates very clearly indicate that a worksheet mus t
    actually be completed for the order or modification of supp ort
    to be made. The responsibility to ensure that the c alculation
    is made using the schedule and worksheet rests with the trial
    court. R.C. 3113.215(B)(1) provides that the court,
    in
    performing its duties under the statute, is not req uired to
    accept any calculations in a worksheet prepared by any
    party to the action or proceeding. As R.C. 3113.215 requires
    the applicable worksheet to be completed, there is
    every
    reason to require that the trial court include that document in
    the record. Only in this fashion can appellate cour ts be
    assured that the literal requirements of R.C. 3113.215 have
    been followed, and that an order or modification of support is
    subject to meaningful appellate review.
    Accordingly, we hold that a child support computati on
    worksheet required to be used by a trial court in c alculating
    the amount of an obligor's child support obligation
    in
    accordance with R.C. 3113.215 must actually be comp leted
    and made a part of the trial court's record. Here,
    if the
    applicable worksheet was completed, it was not incl uded in
    the record and, thus, we are left to speculate as t o how the
    court determined that $300 was the appropriate amou nt of
    child support.

    No. 99AP-736
    8
    In this case, a completed child support worksheet
    is part of the record and
    the amount of child support due based on income for
    appellant in the amount of
    $32,000, and for appellee in the amount of $20,000,
    was calculated at $642.67.
    Appellant argues, in his brief, that his income is
    $21,000, and that there is no evidence
    in the record to support the income amounts used by
    the trial court. As discussed in the
    first and second assignments of error, appellant ha s failed to provide a transcript for this
    court to review and the decision of the trial court
    must be presumed to be correct.
    Further, the record does include a W-2 for appellan t showing his income in 1998 to be
    $32,000.
    The statutory form for the child support worksheet
    does include lines for
    notarized signatures of the parties to indicate whe ther they consent or disagree with the
    amounts set forth. The worksheet completed by the
    court in this case is not signed by
    either party.
    In support of his argument that failure to have th e worksheet signed and
    notarized renders the trial court's decision void, appellant relies on Kelly-Doley v. Doley
    (1999), Lake App. No. 96-L-217, unreported. In Kelly-Doley, a divided court found that
    the failure to have the worksheet prepared by one o f the parties signed and notarized
    required reversal. In reaching its decision, the c ourt relied on McCoy v. McCoy (1995),
    105 Ohio App.3d 651.
    The court in McCoy stated that, in adopting a worksheet submitted by
    the
    parties, the worksheet must be signed and notarized by both parties. In McCoy, there
    was no worksheet in the record but, nonetheless, th e court found the omission harmless
    as there was evidence in the record to support the
    amount of child support ordered and

    No. 99AP-736
    8
    meaningful appellate review was possible. The hold ing in Kelly-Doley and McCoy is
    limited to those cases wherein the court or magistr ate adopts the parties' worksheet,
    rather than preparing its own. There is no indicat ion in this record that the trial court did
    anything other than complete its own worksheet as r equired by statute and, therefore,
    neither Kelly-Doley nor McCoy would be applicable. Likewise, in
    Halley v. Ashley
    (1997), Summit App. No. 18232, unreported, the Nint h District reversed an award of
    child support granted as part of a civil protection order because there was no worksheet
    in the record, not because of a lack of notarized s ignatures to the worksheet.
    In Stewart v. Stewart (1998), Montgomery App. No. 16649, unreported,
    the Second District held that neither R.C. 3113.215
    nor Marker required the parties'
    notarized signatures to be affixed to the child sup port guidelines worksheet. The court
    stated:
    *** Admittedly, the worksheet does contain signatur e lines
    for each party and lines for the notarization of ea ch party's
    signature. We find nothing in the statute, however, requiring
    a party to sign the worksheet. ***
    Similarly, nothing in Marker, supra, mandates that both
    parties must sign and notarize a worksheet before t he trial
    court may adopt it. Contrary to the Fourth District 's holding,
    the cited portion of Marker imposes no such requirement.
    The Marker court held that the trial court must "use" the
    worksheet and that support must be calculated "in
    accordance with" the worksheet. The court also note d that
    "[t]he responsibility to ensure that the calculatio n is made
    using the schedule and worksheet rests with the tri al court."
    Furthermore, the Marker court itself noted that a trial court "is
    not required to accept any calculations in a worksh eet
    prepared by any party to the action or proceeding." ***
    In this case, there is a completed worksheet in th e record, albeit not
    signed by the parties. While the absence of a nota rized signature on the child support

    No. 99AP-736
    8
    guidelines worksheet might alert the trial court to contested issues as to the calculations
    made, it does not render the trial court's decision void. In Marker, the court held that the
    requirements of R.C. 3113.215 must be followed in a ll material respects. The import of
    Marker is that a requirement that a completed worksheet b e included in the record
    insures that evidence of the calculations used by t he trial court are part of the record in
    order to provide meaningful appellate review of the amount of support awarded. The
    lack of a notarized signature to the worksheet does not preclude an appellate court from
    reviewing the trial court's decision as to the amou nt of support ordered. To conclude
    that a signature was mandatory could have the resul t of depriving children of needed
    support where one party willfully refuses to sign t he worksheet, or where, as in this
    instance, appellant failed to sign the worksheet as a result of failing to appear at the
    hearing. Therefore, appellant's third assignment o f error is overruled.
    For the foregoing reasons, appellant's first, seco nd and third assignments
    of error are overruled, and the judgment of the Fra nklin County Court of Common Pleas,
    Division of Domestic Relations, is affirmed.
    Judgment affirmed.
    TYACK and BRYANT, JJ., concur.

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