IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    Anne O'Connell Null,
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    :
    v.
    :
    No. 99AP-523
    Ohio Department of Mental Retardation
    :
    (REGULAR CA LENDAR)
    and Developmental Disabilities et al.,
    :
    Defendants-Appellees.
    :
    _________________________________________________
    O P I N I O N
    Rendered on March 28, 2000
    _________________________________________________
    Michael A. Moses, for appellant.
    Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Jack W. Decker and
    Kevin L. Murch, for appellees.
    _________________________________________________
    APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Ple as.
    BRYANT, J.
    Plaintiff-appellant, Anne O’Connell Null, appeals
    from judgment of the
    Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the
    summary judgment motion of
    defendant-appellee, Ohio Department of Mental Retar dation and Developmental
    Disabilities (“ODMRDD”).
    At all time pertinent, plaintiff was a Licensure
    Specialist with ODMRDD and
    was paid an hourly wage. Her position was included
    in the bargaining unit represented by
    No. 99AP-523
    2
    District 1199, Service Employees International Unio n. Claiming defendant had violated
    relevant law in failing to pay her overtime compens ation, plaintiff filed grievances under
    the collective bargaining agreement the union enter ed into with defendant. Pursuant to a
    settlement between District 1199 and ODMRDD, plaint iff received $3,000 for travel
    expenses incurred and a credit for one hundred fift y hours of compensatory time.
    On July 22, 1997, plaintiff filed a complaint in
    the common pleas court,
    alleging defendant violated the Fair Labor Standard s Act (“FLSA”) and the Ohio Minimum
    Fair Wage Standards Act, R.C. Chapter 4111, in deny ing plaintiff overtime compensation.
    The trial court concluded it lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction to adjudicate the case,
    finding exclusive jurisdiction in the Ohio Court of Claims. On appeal, this court affirmed
    the judgment of the trial court insofar as it found
    the Court of Claims had exclusive
    jurisdiction over plaintiff's FLSA claim, but it re manded the case to the trial court for
    consideration of plaintiff's state law claim. Null v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Retardation & Dev.
    Disabilities (June 30, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APE11-1565, un reported.
    On remand, defendant again filed a summary judgmen t motion, premised
    this time on two arguments: (1) defendant's liabili ty for overtime is determined under R.C.
    124.18, not R.C. 4111.03 as alleged in plaintiff's
    complaint, and (2) pursuant to R.C.
    4117.10(A), the agreement to arbitrate in the colle ctive bargaining agreement bars
    plaintiff's claims. On April 6, 1999, the trial cou rt issued a decision granting defendant's
    motion for summary judgment. The court concluded th at R.C. 4117.10(A) controls
    No. 99AP-523
    3
    plaintiff's claim, leaving the trial court without jurisdiction due to the arbitration clause in
    the collective bargaining agreement.
    Plaintiff appeals, assigning the following errors:
    I. THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
    SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR APPELLEE.
    II. THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN FINDING
    O.R.C. SEC. 4117.10 (A) PREVAILS OVER THE OHIO FAIR
    MINIMUM WAGE STANDARDS ACT, O.R.C. SEC. 4111.01,
    ET SEQ.
    Plaintiff’s two assignments of error are interrela ted and will be addressed
    jointly. Together they assert that the trial court
    erroneously concluded that the collective
    bargaining agreement's arbitration clause rendered the trial court without jurisdiction over
    plaintiff's state law claims. Accordingly, we are a sked to determine which prevails in
    determining jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim und er R.C. 4111.03: the collective bargaining
    agreement and its binding arbitration clause, or R. C. Chapter 4111 pursued through an
    action in the common pleas court.
    R.C. 4117.10(A) establishes the relationship betwe en the provisions of a
    collective bargaining agreement and state laws. It provides:
    An agreement between a public employer and an exclu sive
    representative entered into pursuant to this chapte r governs
    the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of publi c
    employment covered by the agreement. If the agreeme nt
    provides for a final and binding arbitration of gri evances,
    public employers, employees, and employee organizat ions
    are subject solely to that grievance procedure and
    the state
    personnel board of review or civil service commissi ons have
    no jurisdiction to receive and determine any appeal s relating
    to matters that were the subject of a final and bin ding
    No. 99AP-523
    4
    grievance procedure. Where no agreement exists or
    where
    an agreement makes no specification about a matter,
    the
    public employer and public employees are subject to
    all
    applicable state or local laws or ordinances pertai ning to the
    wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employmen t for
    public employees. *** [T]his chapter prevails over any and all
    other conflicting laws, resolutions, provisions, pr esent or
    future, except as otherwise specified in this chapt er or as
    otherwise specified by the general assembly. ***
    Pursuant to R.C. 4117.10(A) when no state or local
    law addresses a
    matter addressed in a collective bargaining agreeme nt, no conflict exists between the
    agreement and the law, and the agreement governs th e parties as to that matter.
    Streetsboro Edn. Assoc. v. Streetsboro City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 68 Ohio
    St.3d 288. Conversely, when a collective bargaining agreement does not address a
    matter but a state or local law does, again no conf lict arises: pursuant to R.C.
    4117.10(A) state or local law generally would apply to a public employer and its public
    employees regarding "wages, hours and terms and con ditions" of employment. Id. at
    291. When, however, a state or local law pertaining
    to a specific exception listed in
    R.C. 4117.10(A) conflicts with a provision in a col lective bargaining agreement
    addressing the same matter, the law prevails and th e provision of the collective
    bargaining agreement is unenforceable. Id. If the conflict does not pertain to one of the
    specific exceptions listed in R.C. 4117.10(A), then the collective bargaining agreement
    prevails. Id.
    Here Article 24 is not silent on the issue of over
    time compensation, but
    rather states: "*** Employees shall receive compens atory time or overtime pay for
    No. 99AP-523
    5
    authorized work performed in excess of forty (40) h ours per week. ***" R.C. 4111.03
    also addresses overtime compensation and provides t hat: "An employer shall pay an
    employee for overtime at a wage rate of one and one -half times the employee's wage
    rate for hours worked in excess of forty hours in o ne workweek, in the manner and
    methods provided in and subject to the exemptions o f section 7 and section 13 of the
    'Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,' 52 Stat. 1060,
    29 U.S.C.A. 207, 213, as amended."
    The provision of the collective bargaining agreeme nt thus not only
    addresses but conflicts with the terms of R.C. 4111 .03. While R.C. 4111.03 requires an
    employer to provide for overtime compensation in th e manner prescribed by the FLSA,
    the collective bargaining agreement does not. Altho ugh the agreement requires the
    additional hours to be “authorized,” R.C. 4111.03 d oes not specifically require
    authorization. While R.C. 4111.03(A) requires overt ime compensation for "hours
    worked" in excess of forty, the collective bargaini ng agreement requires overtime
    compensation for "hours in active pay status" great er than forty. Given the conflict, the
    bargaining agreement prevails unless one of the exc eptions in R.C. 4117.10(A) applies.
    Because R.C. 4117.10(A) does not list R.C. 4111.03
    or the matter of overtime
    compensation as an exception, the collective bargai ning agreement with its arbitration
    provision prevails. S treetsboro, supra.
    Plaintiff nonetheless asserts that pursuant to
    Naylor v. Cardinal Local
    School Dist. Bd. of Edn . (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 162, a collective bargainin g agreement
    No. 99AP-523
    6
    does not deprive an employee of independent statuto ry rights unless that particular right
    has been specifically excluded or negated by the ag reement.
    Naylor acknowledged the Ohio Supreme Court's holding that a provision
    of a collective bargaining agreement may prevail ov er a conflicting statute. Relying,
    however, on State ex rel. Clark v. Greater Cleveland Regional T ransit Auth. (1990), 48
    Ohio St.3d 19, Naylor held that unless a collective bargaining agreement "specifically
    provides to the contrary, R.C. 3319.111 governs the evaluation of a teacher employed
    under a limited contract." Naylor, paragraph two of the syllabus.
    Naylor is not dispositive here. Initially, by its syllabus language Naylor is
    confined to determining whether R.C. 3319.111 is re ndered ineffective under R.C.
    4117.10(A) by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the rationale
    of Naylor is premised, at least in part, on the fact that th e collective bargaining
    agreement was entered into before the effective dat e of R.C. 3319.111. Here, R.C.
    4111.03 pre-existed the collective bargaining agree ment. Finally, to accept plaintiff's
    interpretation of Naylor at the least would modify the test set forth in
    Streetsboro, yet
    Naylor does not overrule or modify Streetsboro.
    Further, Clark, relied on in Naylor, is unlike the issue here. In Clark, the
    statute and the collective bargaining agreement did not conflict because the collective
    bargaining agreement did not specifically address t he matter at issue in Clark. It thus
    did not negate the statutory rights. Here, by contr ast, the collective bargaining
    agreement does address overtime compensation in muc h the same fashion as R.C.
    No. 99AP-523
    7
    4111.03, and thus conflicts with R.C. 4111.03. Unde r Streetsboro, because R.C.
    4111.03 is not specifically excepted by R.C. 4117.1 0(A), the collective bargaining
    agreement prevails.
    R.C. 4117.10(A) further states that if the labor a greement provides for
    final and binding arbitration, then employers, empl oyees, and labor unions are subject
    solely to that grievance procedure as set forth in
    the labor contract. Section 7.07(F) of
    the collective bargaining agreement at issue provid es for final and binding arbitration.
    Albright v. Jackson (May 15, 1990), Franklin App. No. 89AP-1215, unrep orted; see,
    also, MacKnight v. Lake Cty. Dept. of Human Serv. (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 181;
    Cook v. Maxwell (1989), 57 Ohio App.3d 131. Accordingly, the trial
    court properly
    concluded it lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff's c laims under R.C. 4111.03.
    For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's two assignm ents of error are
    overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is a ffirmed.
    Judgment affirmed.
    BOWMAN, P.J., and TYACK, J., concur.
    ___________

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