IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    Arlend Sammons,
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    :
    v.
    :
    No. 99AP-796
    Board of Commissioners of Franklin
    :
    (ACCEL
    ERATED CALENDAR)
    County et al.,
    :
    Defendants-Appellants.
    :
    O P I N I O N
    Rendered on April 18, 2000
    Phillip L. Harmon , for appellant.
    Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Harland H. Hale , for
    appellee Board of Commissioners of Franklin County.
    Janet E. Jackson , City Attorney, Daniel W. Drake and
    Todd M. Rodgers , for appellee City of Columbus.
    APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Ple as.
    McCORMAC, J.
    Plaintiff, Arlend Sammons, appeals, asserting as h is sole assignment of error,
    the granting by the Court of Common Pleas of Frankl in County the motions of defendants
    City of Columbus and Franklin County for summary ju dgment.
    From September 1991 to October 1995, plaintiff ope rated a gas station and
    convenience store located at 331 Neil Avenue, Colum bus, Ohio. Plaintiff operated the

    No. 99AP-796
    7
    business under an oral lease from the property owne r, William Wilson. The gas station,
    known as the "Big House Fuel Mart," was located on
    the northwest corner of Neil Avenue
    and Dublin Avenue with ingress and egress available from both streets. The property
    was located on the west side of Neil Avenue which s eparated it from the property of the
    former Ohio Penitentiary.
    Defendants City of Columbus and Franklin County ar e lessees of the Ohio
    Penitentiary under a lease with the state of Ohio w hich was executed in 1990 in which
    said defendants assumed a legal duty to maintain an d manage the Ohio Penitentiary.
    On July 6, 1994, a section of the Ohio Penitentiar y's east outer wall
    collapsed and crashed to the ground damaging severa l automobiles. After that incident,
    the city initiated an inspection of the penitentiar y's perimeter wall. As a result, the
    remainder of its outer wall was demolished, includi ng the west wall across from the Big
    House Fuel Mart. During the demolition, Neil Avenu e was closed for approximately six
    weeks during August and September 1994. The closur e prohibited access to two of four
    driveways used for ingress and egress to the Big Ho use Fuel Mart, leaving two driveways
    for public access still available by use of Dublin
    Avenue.
    In August 1995, Columbia Gas was digging on the so uthwest corner of
    Dublin and Neil Avenues and detected substantial fr ee petroleum contamination in the
    ground. After Columbia Gas informed the Ohio Burea u of Underground Storage Tank
    Regulations (hereinafter "BUSTR") of the discovery,
    BUSTR investigated the
    contamination and ordered the immediate shutdown of the fuel pumps at the Big House
    Fuel Mart. The property owner, Mr. Wilson, contrac ted with Omega Environmental to

    No. 99AP-796
    7
    remove the fuel tanks. The tanks were not replaced
    and plaintiff completely closed his
    business after October 1995.
    We first consider the claim of plaintiff for busin ess interruption damages
    during the six weeks Neil Avenue was closed while t he penitentiary's perimeter wall was
    being razed for damages from the alleged negligence
    of defendants to maintain or
    inspect the penitentiary wall. Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to a jury trial to submit
    his claim for damages from partial loss of business during the six-week period as two of
    the four entry ways to the filling station were clo sed as well as for continuing damages for
    interruption of business until October 1995 when pl aintiff no longer operated the filling
    station. The claim for continuing business interru ption is based upon the testimony of
    plaintiff that his business never recovered as many
    of his former customers started
    purchasing their gas from someone else and no longe r returned to his station.
    There is sufficient evidence to constitute a reaso nable fact for the jury to
    determine about whether defendants negligently fail ed to inspect and maintain the
    perimeter walls of the penitentiary. Defendants ac quired this duty as a result of the lease
    from the owner of the former Ohio Penitentiary and,
    thus, undertook any duty that the
    owner would have a duty to anyone proximately injur ed by the negligent failure.
    The crucial issue concerning this claim for relief
    is whether the damages
    alleged to have been sustained were reasonably fore seeable from the failure of
    defendants to inspect and maintain the penitentiary wall. See Menifee v. Ohio Welding
    Products (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 75, 77. Defendants only owe d a duty to prevent the type

    No. 99AP-796
    7
    of injuries that are reasonably foreseeable as a re sult of its alleged failure to maintain the
    wall.
    When reviewing the grant of summary judgment, the
    principles guiding the
    standard of review are set forth in Civ.R. 56(C) wh ich mandates that the following be
    established: (1) that there is no genuine issue o f any material fact, (2) that the moving
    party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, a nd (3) that reasonable minds can come
    to but one conclusion and, viewing the evidence mos t strongly in favor of the nonmoving
    party, that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving
    party. Bostic v. Connor (1988), 37
    Ohio St.3d 144.
    There are few, if any, facts in dispute concerning
    the collapse of the wall
    other than the cause for it which, as stated previo usly, is a question of fact for a jury.
    However, there must also be a factual issue for the
    jury that would, if resolved favorably,
    allow recovery of damages suffered during the time
    that Neil Avenue was closed and
    there was partial restriction of access to plaintif f's filling station. The crucial issue is that
    of proximate causation. Even though there is a dut y and a breach of that duty, damages
    are not allowable unless they are proximately cause d by the breach of duty attributed to
    defendants. In this case, there was no physical da mage caused to the property which
    plaintiff leased. The restriction of ingress to pl aintiff's filling station was partial only as
    there were two lanes of access from an unaffected s treet. The partial restriction occurred
    for only six weeks, a time that in all probability
    would have occurred even if defendants
    had discovered that the wall was in poor condition
    before its collapse as it was the razing
    of the perimeter wall that caused the closing of th e street. Construing all facts most

    No. 99AP-796
    7
    favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that a reasonab le finder of fact could not find a
    proximate compensable causation between the closure of Neil Avenue for six weeks,
    particularly in light of the fact that the city has
    a duty to keep its streets open and in repair,
    safe from conditions that could cause damages to on going users. Any alleged damages
    from a diminished continuation of business, alleged ly because of customers going
    elsewhere during the six-week period, is also not c ompensable.
    For the reasons
    discussed previously and because they are too specu lative to be compensable. Thus,
    plaintiff's claim for damages for negligence due to Neil Avenue being closed for six weeks
    while the penitentiary perimeter wall was razed was
    subject to summary judgment
    determination, there being no genuine issue of fact
    concerning foreseeable damages.
    The trial court did not err in granting summary jud gment for this part of the claim.
    Plaintiff further seeks damages that he alleges we re proximately caused by
    the nuisance or trespass of defendants due to alleg ed underground contamination
    emanating from the penitentiary site proximately ca using termination of his lease and
    damages stemming therefrom.
    Plaintiff argues that there is a genuine issue of
    fact about whether the
    pollution, which resulted in the removal of the gas oline tanks at the Big House Fuel Mart
    site and closure of the filling station, came from
    leaking tanks at the filling station site or
    from pollution that came from the penitentiary site .
    Even if there were facts giving rise to a reasonab le inference that the
    contamination, in whole or part, came from the peni tentiary site, plaintiff's claim for relief
    for damages incurred by the closure of the leased f illing station fails as a matter of law.

    No. 99AP-796
    7
    The record is undisputed that BUSTR ordered plaint iff to close his pumps.
    The reason for the closure was not because of conta mination on or around the Big House
    Fuel Mart and Neil Avenue but, rather, because BUST R suspected that the tanks
    operated by the Big House Fuel Mart were leaking.
    Plaintiff admits that BUSTR would
    have permitted resumption of fuel sales once they w ere satisfied that the underground
    tanks were not leaking. Plaintiff or the lessor of
    the property could have demonstrated
    that the tanks were not leaking by performing a lea k test on the tanks which both plaintiff
    and the property owner refused to do. There is no
    evidence that defendants ordered
    plaintiff to close his pumps or to mitigate any con tamination, either under the Big House
    Fuel Mart site or under Neil or Dublin Avenues.
    Th e property owner made the
    independent decision to have the underground tanks removed after BUSTR ordered them
    closed. The decision to remove the tanks was not c aused by defendants' alleged
    negligent maintenance of the penitentiary site, but because BUSTR believed that the
    tanks were leaking.
    Plaintiff chose to terminate his business because
    he could not reach an
    agreement with the property owner for a long term l ease. He voluntarily chose to
    terminate his business and his month-to-month inter est in the property.
    Summary judgment was properly granted to defendant s on the issue of
    trespass or negligence in the contamination of soil
    from the penitentiary site. The
    circumstances surrounding the termination of his bu siness were, as a matter of law, not
    proximately caused by defendants.

    No. 99AP-796
    7
    Plaintiff's assignment of error is overruled and t he judgment of the trial court
    is affirmed.
    Judgment affirmed.
    BRYANT and DESHLER, JJ., concur.
    McCORMAC, J., retired, of the Tenth Appellate Distr ict,
    assigned to active duty under authority of Section 6(C), Article
    IV, Ohio Constitution.

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